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Some implications of the proposals of the Delors Committee for the
Economic and Monetary Union on monetary and fiscal policies in Europe
are analysed. The merits for an independent ESCB are discussed. In
addition, four good reasons why, in the absence of European coordination
of budgetary policies, the size of the public sector may be too small
relative to the first-best outcome are given. The first is that with an
independent central bank seigniorage revenues will only accrue through
real growth, so that taxes must be raised and exhaustive public spending
must be cut. The second is that an economic union means that spending by
an individual treasury benefits the other treasuries, so that there is
an inadequate provision of public goods. The third is that
international competition drives tax rates down and leaves less funds
for the public sector. The fourth is that an appreciation of the real
exchange rate of Europe has the nature of ó public good, hence the level
of exhaustive public spending tends to be too low.
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Europe is in the process of becoming more and more integrated. The
removal of all physical, technical and fiscal obstacles to free
intra-European trade in goods and services and to free factor movements
within Europe should lead to the completion of the internal market for
Europe by 1992. Most of Europe's capital markets should be liberalised
by lst July 1990. The proposals of the Delors Committee for Economic
and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) have given a great impetus to this
process. The proposals also involve the delegation of the responsibility
of monetary policy to a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which
requires a new Treaty of Rome, the establishment of a common European
Currency Unit (ECU) in parallel to the existing national currencies, and
(after narrowing the bands of the European Monetary System) a move
towards irrevocably fixed intra-European exchange rates. Some of the
more controversial proposals of the Delors Committee are that national
governments of the EMU will face restrictions on the size of public
sector deficits, will not be allowed to finance spending by printing
money, and will face limits on borrowing from abroad. This paper is
concerned with the effects of the EMU on the conduct of fiscal policy in
Europe and, in particular, on the size of the public sector in Europe.
The standard view is that the EMU will only work when Europe is an
optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961). Although there is plenty of
labour mobility between West-Germany and East-Germany, cultural,
historical, language and housing barriers make a significant degree of
labour mobility within the rest of Europe an unlikely event. This lack
of mobility leads to problems of adjustment and a need for stabilisation
policy, particularly when idiosyncratic shocks hit the countries of the
EMU. For example, consider a switch in the taste of preferences away
from goods produced by Britain towards goods produced by France. In a
first-best world where all markets clear immediately, there is no need
for labour mobility or a flexible pound-franc exchange rate. The trade
deficit of Britain with France will disappear, because prices in Britain
will fall and prices in France will rise. In a second-best world
nominal wages and prices are rigid in the short run, so the alternatives
are to either have a depreciation of the pound or to have people migrate
from Britain to France. The former cannot happen under the EMU, whilst2
the latter is unlikely to occur (neither is Britain likely to produce
French goods). Nominal wages and prices would, of course, adjust ir. the
long run, but this is accompanied by transitory unemployment in Britain
and transitory over-employment in France. This is why the EMU performs
badly under idiosyncratic shocks and is dominated by regimes of floating
exchange rates (van der Ploeg, 1989b). Some argue that Europe should
learn from fiscal federalism in the US and have a Federal Transfer
Scheme to cushion the impact of shocks by a redistribution of income,
say tax the French and transfer the revenue to individuals in Britain.
Initial estimates for the US suggest that a third of state-specific
shocks are cushioned by federal transfers (Sachs and Sala-i-Martin,
1989 ) .
Although there are serious incentive problems associated with such
a budget-neutral transfer scheme for the EMU (van der Ploeg, 1990), it
may be all that is available because the limits on budget deficits
proposed by the Delors Committee act pro-cyclically and are not likely
to lead to successful stabilisation policies. It seems more sensible
not to set limits on budget deficits and let the countries of the EMU
pursue their own counter-cyclical stabilisation policies. When all
countries of Europe are hit by identical shocks, the EMU seems by far
the best exchange-rate regime since beggar-thy-neighbour attempts to
appreciate the currency and export inflation are avoided. Given that
the goods markets of Europe are becoming more and more integrated, there
is a problem that in the face of a common adverse supply shock the
fiscal stance of the countries of the EMU will in the absence of
European coordination of budgetary policies be too tight.l
The stabilisation aspects of the EMU are thus quite clear. There
will be a need for coordinatioa of fiscal policies, perhaps, even for a
European Federal Transfer Scheme or, alternatively, there should be no
1 The reason is that as the goods markets of Europe become more and more
integrated, the beneficial effects of a fiscal expansion in one country of the
EMU on net exports of other EMU-countries are likely to dominate the adverse
effects arising from higher interest rates and crowding out. The result is
that a fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy, which in the absence of policy
coordination within the EMU will not be used enough to fight stagflation (van
der Ploeg, 1989a).3
restrictions on the budget deficits of individual treasuries. The
allocatior. and public-fir.ance aspects of the EMU have received much less
attention and are the main subject of this paper. The question we would
like to address is whether the EMU poses a threat to the current size of
the public sector or not. However, we address ourselves to the easier
question of whether the EMU leads to a too small public sector relative
to the outcome under the first-best outcome. To answer this question,
we will consider the optimal revenue mix for treasuries and central
banks and also consider the optimal size of the public sector.
Attention will be paid to the role of public debt and foreign debt in
smoothing tax and seigniorage revenues and private consumption. In
addition, we will compare non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes. We
first consider the disadvantages and advantages of an independent ESCB
and then move on to the potential gains of coordinating fiscal policies
under the EMU on the assumption that it can benefit f rom an independent
ESCB.
In Section 2 we consider the competition among the central banks and
treasuries of a monetary union. Each treasury is assumed to be able to
appropriate a certain amount of the seigniorage revenues collected by
the common central bank. The main result is that absence of
coordination between the various ministers of finance leads to excessive
monetary growth and inflation throughout the region and to too low
national tax rates, because each treasury fails to internalise the
adverse effects of grabbing more seigniorage from the common central
bank on the common inflation rate. When money demand depends negatively
on inflation, this leads to an erosion of the base for raising
seigniorage revenues and may even put the region on the wrong side of
the seigniorage Laffer curve (Aizenman, 1989). Given that monetary
discipline and credibility are not assumed to be a problem, the case of
an independent common central bank comes off worst from the welfare
point of view because it leads to a sub-optimal public revenue mix.
However, an independent central bank may be desirable when discipline
cannot be guaranteed and when ministers of finance are otherwise known
to succomb to the temptation of levying a surprise inflation tax in
order to, say, wipe out the real value of public debt and reduce tax
distortions.4
In Section 3 we modify the analysis in four directions, because we
want to capture the flavour of the proposals for the EMU recently put
forward by the Delors Committee in a better way. Firstly, individual
treasuries are only permitted to appropriate the seigniorage that occurs
through real growth since the ESCB is independent and is charged solely
with the objective of maintaining price stability. Instead, they have
to finance most of their budget deficits by issuing debt. The treasuries
can se11 their debt to private individuals at home and abroad, both in
the other countries of the EMU and outside the EMU, and to the ESCB and
other banks outside the EMU. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that
bonds are perfect substitutes. This does not seem unreasonable, as a
short cut, because most of the capital markets of Europe are meant to be
fully liberalised by lst July 1990. The ESCB prints the ECUs and uses
the proceeds from seigniorage to purchase bonds on the open market.
Secondly, we no longer assume that the monetary union is a closed
economy. Instead we assume that the EMU is a small open economy
vis-à-vis the rest of the world which takes interest rates as given on
the world market. We can then focus on an externality associated with
the joint determination of the real exchange rate and current account of
Europe versus the rest of the world. A fiscal expansion by any of the
treasuries of the EMU raises the demand for European goods relative to
goods from the rest of the world and thus induces an appreciation of the
real exchange rate of Europe and a deficit on Europe's current account.
Absence of policy coordination in Europe means that Europe's current
account is not recognised as a public good and thus leads to inefficient
outcomes for the fiscal policies pursued under the EMU (cf., Cohen and
Wyplosz, 1989). Thirdly, we assume that each member country of the EMU
also cares about the level of public goods provided by other member
countries. In view of the planned completion of the internal market for
Europe, it seems reasonable to suppose that countries care about each
others' levels of spending on the environment, research and development,
foreign aid, infrastructure, museums, etcetera. The absence of policy
coordination means that public spending is not recognised as a public
good for Europe as a whole and therefore its supply will be too low.
Finally, we also allow for the possibility that each country of the EMU
also attempts to have slightly lower taxes than its competitors. This5
form of tax competition drives down tax rates and levels of public
spending.
In Section 4 we conclude by making a case for an independent ESCB
and arguing that, unless budgetary policies are coordinated, the EMU
leads to a smaller size of the public sector. Those who think that the
current size of the public sector in Europe is too large, will welcome
such developments. Others might not and will argue for the coordination
of budgetary policies in order to safe-guard the size of the public
sector in Europe.
2. Competition among the treasuries and central banks of a monetary
union
2. 1 The mode 1
The monetary union consists of N countries denoted by the subscripts
i-1,...,N. Exchange rates are irrevocably fixed and consequently there
is a common inflation rate throughout the region. Treasury i's primary
budget deficit is defined as the excess of exhaustive public spending
(gi) over tax revenues (ii). Its full deficit includes interest
payments on outstanding debt (rdi) and must be financed by selling debt
(di) or by seigniorage revenues (si). The (growth-corrected) real
interest rate (r) is determined on the world market. It follows that
the budget constraints of the treasuries are given by
d. - rd, f g. - t. - s., d.(0)-d. , i- 1,...,N, (2.1)
i i i i i i io
where all quantity variables are expressed as fractions of the
full-employment level of national income. Individual treasuries are, in
contrast to the rather strange recommendation of the Delors Committee
for guidelines on public sector deficits, free to borrow on the open
market as long as they remain solvent. Solvency of a treasury requires
that its debt must not grow at a faster rate than the interest rate in
the long run. When the treasuries are solvent, their budget constraints
can be written as6
rdi t gp - tp t sp, i-1,...,N (2. 1' )
when the permanent level of exhaustive public spending is defined as
~
gp(t)-r f exp[-r(s-t)] ge(s,t) ds ,
t
where gi(s,t) denotes the expected value of gi(s), s~t, conditional on
all information available at time t, and iP and sp are defined in a
similar fashion. In other words, the current treasury debt plus the
present value of the stream of future exhaustive public spending must
equal the present value of the stream of future direct tax and
seigniorage revenues. The central bank of the monetary union is run by
the various treasuries and thus not independent, so its budget
constraint is given by
N
E si - 6mN
i-1
(2.2)
where 9 denotes the monetary growth rate of the region and m denotes the
holdings of real money balances by an individual country. For the time
being, we assume that the velocity of circulation and thus m is constant
and the same for each country. The quantity theory of money then says
that the common rate of inflation (n) is determined by the excess of
monetary growth (9) over growth in real income (n).
2.2 Absence of cooperation causes excessive inflation
Each treasury is concerned with the most efficient revenue mix for
financing a given stream of exhaustive public spending. In other words,7
each treasury wishes to minimise the excess burden caused by raising tax
and seigniorage revenues. We assume that the dead-weight losses
correspond to the familiar welfare triangles2 and are proportional to
real output, so that the welfare-loss function of treasury i can be
written as:3
Wi- 2 f exp(-rt)Izif(3n2ldt, (3 ~ 0.
0
(2. 3)
When treasury i chooses a sequence of ii and si to minimise (2.3)
subject to (2.1'), (2.2) and n- 6- n, taking ij, sj, j~i as given, we
obtain the non-cooperative outcome (denoted by the superscript N). When
all treasuries .iointly choose 7i, si, i-1, ..., N, to minimise W1 f W2 t
...WN, we obtain the cooperative outcome (denoted by the superscript C).
.
A non-cooperative monetary union leads to ii-(S~mN)nN, tN-O,
i-1,...,N, whilst a cooperative monetary union leads to zC-(S~m)nC,
zi-0, i-1,...,N. Each of the countries has an equal say in running the
central bank of the monetary union, so we assume that the cooperative
outcome simply minimises the sum of the countries' welfare losses. This
is the reason that the marginal distortion from collecting seigniorage
revenues i s N times as large under the cooperative as under the
non-cooperative outcome.
The fundamental insight common to both the non-cooperative and
cooperative outcome is that tax rates are smoothed (cf., Barro, 1979),
2 There is a slight problem in justifying the cost of inflation in terms of
triangles under the money demand schedule, since under the quantity theory
this schedule is flat and in general the empirical magnitude of these costs
have been small. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that inflation
is costly (e.g., Fischer and Modigliani, 1975). One possibility is that a
higher level of anticipated inflation leads to a higher variance of
unanticipated inflation, which then in the absence of full indexation causes a
misallocation of resources, arbitrary redistributions and, perhaps, fewer
long-term contracts.
3 This (and the model of Section 3) adopts a reduced-form approach in order to
get a quick grasp of the policy issues involved. There is thus a danger that
some of the results do not carry over to a fully specified model of the
ongoing strategic interactions between optimising governments and a rational
private sector in which one distinguishes between pre-commitment and (Markov)
perfect equilibria (Obstfeld, 1990).
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that inflation rates are smoothed, and that tax and seigniorage revenues
go up and down together (Mankiw, 1987; Grilli, 1989). The point is that
the marginal distortions from the various current and future sources of
raising revenues must be equalised4 and that the treasuries may only
borrow to finance transitory increases in exhaustive public spending.
The best example is that treasuries are allowed to borrow for investment
projects with a market rate of return, because these leave the permanent
level of exhaustive public spending unaffected but increase the actual
level of exhaustive public spending. In general, there is a trade-off
between aiming for zero tax distortions and aiming for zero inflation
(or full liquidity) which leads to both positive tax rates and positive
inflation rates (Phelps, 1973).
Since there is a common inflation rate throughout the region, tax
rates must be the same throughout the region as well, even though levels
of exhaustive public spending and of public debt may vary from country
to country. This has interesting implications for the solidarity
required in a monetary union. When a monetary union consists of two
countries, the first with a higher level of permanent spending and the
second with a smaller need for public revenues (rdltgP~rd2tg2), the
first country obtains more seigniorage revenues from the common central
bank than the second country (sl~s2). In other words, a monetary union
is sustainable only when countries with a small public sector transfer
revenues to countries with a large public sector. Alternatively, when
the costs of tax collection or the size of the black economy are much
larger in one country than in the other countries (smaller S for some
countries), tax rates are lower than the average and the country also
receives an implicit transfer of seigniorage revenues. The Delors
Report recommends a convergence of levels of public spending and debt.
This seems reasonable in view of the above observation that the
political sustainability of a monetary union is then more likely. An
even stronger view is that such redistributions are politically so
unlikely that a dependent ESCB is never going to happen. A more
4 The tax-smoothing result depends on the rate of time preference being the
same as the market rate of interest. If it is greater (smaller), governments
are relatively impatient (patient) and the tax and inflation rates must be
expected to increase (decline) over time.9
optimistic view holds that the distribution of seigniorage according to
need is the political price one has to pay for monetary unification.
Substitution into the treasuries' intertemporal budget constraints
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where gp is defined as gp - E gP ~N and d and i are defined in a
i-1
similar fashion. Conflict between the national ministries of finance of
a monetary union leads to excessive monetary growth and inflation (and
thus to too low direct tax rates), because each country fails to
internalise the adverse effects of grabbing more seigniorage on the
other countries of the monetary union. International policy
coordination leads to lower monetary growth and higher tax rates.
There are two extensions to the above argument. The first is to
allow money demand (m) to depend negatively on inflation. In that case,
the lack of international policy coordination also leads to an erosion
of the base for raising seigniorage revenues and may even put the region
on the wrong side of the seigniorage Laffer curve (Aizenman, 1989).5
The second is that individual treasuries may also care about their
balance of payments position. The monetary approach to the balance of
5 However, if there are only two assets, money and bonds, and the portfolio
shares (mi~(mifdi)) depend on the relative rate of return on these assets,
i.e., inflation, the optimal steady-state inflation rate for a closed economy
(and thus for a cooperative monetary union) is determined by the full
liquidity rule (Turnovsky and Brock, 1980; Yashiv, 1989). It follows that
inflation and tax rates do not necessarily need to go up and down together
anymore and that international policy coordination in a monetary union without




payments gives the common inflation rate as n- 1 E 6i - n- 9- n,
N i-1
where 9. - s.~m denotes the rate of domestic credit expansion for
i i
country i, and the balance of payments (as a fraction of the demand for
money) of country i as zi - 6- ei. When the average of the desired
values for the zi's is negative, absence of international coordination
of monetary policies causes excessive inflation as countries try to
defend themselves against reserve accumulation by expanding domestic
credit and thus raising the common inflation rate (Hamada, 1976).
2.3 The case for an independent ESCB
Many practitioners advocate an independent central bank (denoted by
thesuperscript I) whose policy should be solely directed at maintaining
price stability. This leads to nI-O, ii-0, i-1,...,N, and il-rdfgp-nm.
An independent central bank achieves a stable price level and thus the
ministries of finance need to resort to higher tax rates than would be
the case with a dependent central bank. It is easy to show that
WI~WN~WC~
so that the lowest welfare loss is achieved when the various
ministers of finance coordinate their budgetary and monetary policies
and the highest welfare loss is achieved under an independent central
bank.
Why then do practitioners advocate an independent central bank?
Why then does the Delors Report strongly advocate an independent ESCB
based on the German model?6 The main reason is that they do not trust
treasuries to havesufficient monetary discipline to guarantee price
stability, because they forever have the temptation to levy an inflation
tax in order to finance additional public spending, or to accommodate
demands for higher wages. Practitioners believe that an independent
6In fact, the Delors Report recommends a federal structure in which the
central banks of the EMU-countries are incorporated in a ESCB. The ESCB
should have three levels of organisation: (i) the Council of the ESCB
consisting of the presidents of the national central banks, which are
independent of Community and national authorities (cf., the German
"Zentralbankrat"); (ii) the Board of the ESCB, which monitors monetary
developments and oversees the implementation of the common monetary policy
(cf., the "Direktorium"); and (iii) the national central banks which execute
the decisions taken by the Council (cf., the "Landeszentralbanken").11
central bank, directed by ultra-conservative central bankers who only
care about price stability, will not succomb to a surprise inflation tax
in order to wipe out the real value of outstanding nominal treasury debt
(e. g. , Gros, 1988), the real value of the nominal wage (e. g. , Barro and
Gordon, 1983) or the real value of money balances (e.g., Calvo, 1970,
Barro, 1983). Whenever this does happen, equilibrium inflation will be
higher and equilibrium tax rates will be lower. Since ministers of
finance, unions and other agents anticipate that an independent central
bank is not going to give in to their demands, they settle for less and
as a result inflation is lower and taxes are higher than would be the
case under a dependent central bank without much monetary discipline.
Undoubtedly, this is the reason why central bankers -- the main
signatories of the Delors Report -- are very much in favour of an
independent ESCB. Hence,it is more relevant to compare cooperative and
non-cooperative outcomes under a dependent central bank (i.e.,
discretion denoted with the superscripts ND and CD, respectively) with
the outcome under an independent central bank (i.e., rules). To assess
the case for an independent central bank, one should trade off the
disadvantage of a sub-optimal government revenue mix against the
advantage of better monetary discipline and the lower inflation this
brings with it.
Italy has a larger black economy and a less efficient tax system
than Germany and therefore finds it optimal to extract relatively more
revenues from seigniorage than from direct taxation (e.g., Canzoneri and
Rogers, 1990). Some even argue that this is a good reason against the
EMU and in favour of a crawling peg between the currencies of northern
and southern Europe for this would accommodate the required inflation
differential (e.g., Dornbusch, 1988). However, this argument ignores
the monetary discipline the Bundesbank gives to the Banca d'Italia under
the European Monetary System (EMS) (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988) and
hopefully under the EMU. The gain in central bank credibility and the
accompanied tying of one's hands may be the main advantage of the EMS
and hopefully the EMU. This advantage is particularly relevant for
countries with a large stock of outstanding nominal government debt,
such as Italy and the Netherlands, and with a greater preference for low12
inflation than eliminating tax distortions (Gros, 1988).7
To illustrate the argument, attention will be focused on the
monetary discipline an independent ESCB may offer in safe-guarding the
real value of public debt, probably the most important source of time
inconsistency for Europe, but it is important to realise that the
arguments in favour of an independent central bank could just as easily
have been made in terms of removing the incentive to use unanticipated
inflation to achieve a temporary gain in employment.8 Treasuries now
issue nominal (rather than real or indexed) bonds with a guaranteed
nominal rate of return, r t ne where ne denotes the expected inflation
rate. The expected or ex-ante real interest rate, the real interest
rate for short, is according to the Fisherian hypothesis determined by
consumption tastes and production technologies, more or less independent
of the expected inflation rate. For given tastes and production
technologies, any change in nominal interest rates must then be due to a
change in expected inflation rates. The realised or ex-post real
interest rate, r f ne - n, is relevant for the borrowing and lending
activities of the treasuries. It decreases with unanticipated
inflation, which is one way in which governments can reduce the level of
their inflation-corrected deficits and reduce the growth of their
debt-GDP ratios.9 It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium
7 In any case, one could argue that one should implement the first-best policy
of eradicating the black economy thus reducing the costs of tax collection and
enabling oneseif to cut the inflation rate. Alternatively, one might try to
explain the inefficiency of the tax system and the associated reliance on
seigniorage in terms of how unstable and polarised the political system
is (Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1989).
8 Wage indexation is prevalent throughout Europe, so there is presumably less
of a possibility to use a surprise inflation to erode the real value of the
wage. The ratio of real (high-powered) money balances to public debt is
general ly quite small (13X for the UK, 23'I. for the Netherlands, 30'I. for Spain
and 76~ for Germany over the period 1962-1987) and as money is mainly held for
transactions rather than for speculative purposes, it seems reasonable to
focus on the incentives to wipe out the real value of public debt. Of course,
the first-best policy is to destroy such incentives to renege on nominal
contracts through, for example, the issue of indexed rather than nominal
bonds. Conversely, an independent ESCB does not destroy all forms of capital
levy.
9 Since d. is no longer a predetermined variable, an increase in the level
i13
ND rdtgp-nm CD - rdfgp-nm I
~ - mt~~(mNfd) ~ ~ - mtSl(mtd ~ ~ -0
(2.6)
and thus that
iND ~ 7CD ~ zI must hold. The presence of an outstanding
nominal public debt is an open invitation to wipe it out with an
unanticipated inflation tax. Since a dependent ESCB cannot be trusted
not to take up the invitation, inflation under the discretionary
outcomes is higher than under the rules outcomes (nND ~ n~ and ~CD ~
~CR)
As far as the treasuries are concerned a dependent ESCB and
competition within the EMU improves welfare, because this reduces tax
distortions. However, as far as central bankers are concerned, this
increases inflation and thus reduces welfare. This is in a nutshell the
conflict between ministers of finance and central bankers.
The condition under which an independent ESCB (I) yields higher
welfare than a dependent ESCB with cooperation among the treasuries (CD)
is given by
(R-m2)d ~ ( ~fm2)m, (2.7)
whilst the condition under which one prefers an independent ESCB over a
non-cooperative EMU and a dependent ESCB (ND) is given by
(S-m2)d ~ IS(2-N)tNm2]m. (2.8)
One is more likely to come out strongly in favour of an independent ESCB
rather than a cooperative EMU with a dependent ESCB when the level of
public debt in Europe and when the priority one attaches to eliminating
inflation rather than to cutting tax distortions is high. It is
rather than the Qrowth of the nominal money supply leads to an equal i ncrease
in the price level and can thus be used to wipe out the real value of public
debt at "the stroke of a pen". Here we are concerned, however, with
unanticipated increases in inflation.14
therefore not much of a surprise that the Delors Committee, which
consisted largely of central bankers, has come out in favour of an
independent ESCB.
Inequality (2.8) is more (less) likely to be violated as the number
of inembers of the EMU increases, provided that S exceeds (is less than)
m2. In other words, when the priority one attaches to price stability
exceeds the priority one attaches to getting rid of tax distortions and
the number of EMU-countries is large, one always prefers an independent
ESCB to a non-cooperative EMU with a dependent ESCB. When one,
nevertheless, comes out in favour of an independent ESCB, one should be
aware that macroeconomic policy coordination within the EMU may well be
counterproductivel0 when one restricts attention to discretionary
outcomes. The following counter-example makes the point: when d--m,
the CD-outcome yields the same welfare as the I-outcome and, when S(N-3)
~ m2(N-i), the ND-outcome yields a higher welfare than the I-outcome, so
that the CD-outcome is worse than the ND-outcome. Sufficient conditions
for the inequality are N-2, N-3 or S~m2. Macroeconomic policy
coordination destroys discipline and can thus be counterproductive.ll
This is more likely to occur when the advantage of cooperation in the
form of lower inflation is outweighed by the disadvantage in the form of
more tax distortions and when the number of countries is small. The
counter-example can be understood by thinking of a clPVer scheme for
restructuring treasury debt in order to overcome the problem of time
inconsistency in the cooperative outcome: eliminate the incentive to
erode the stock of real money balances by buying an equal stock of
nominal bonds from the public (so when a treasury reneges it loses just
as much on its assets as it gains on real money balances) and issue
indexed bonds for the remainder. In the non-cooperative outcome there
10 Macroeconomic policy coordination under the EMU can also be
counterproductive when budgetary policies are used to fight stagflation caused
by a global supply shock, because this may provide an adverse response from
the US (van der Ploeg, 1989a).
11
This also occurs under a regime of floating exchange rates when the monetary
authorities are tempted to use a surprise inflation to erode the real value of
wages and boost employment (Rogoff, 1985) or to use the seigniorage revenues
to reduce distortionary taxes and boost the level of exhaustive public
spending (van der Ploeg, 1988).
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is still an incentive to renege leading to higher inflation, but this
may be desirable when the costs of collecting taxes are high enough.
The Delors Committee has come out strongly in favour of an
independent ESCB for the EMU, which may be justified in terms of the
enhanced monetary discipline this would offer. A related argument in
favour of an independent ESCB is that this avoids the costs associated
with unpredictabïlity of inflation. We will assume an independent ESCB
in the remainder of the paper. Monetary policy then ensures a stable
price level, which means that monetary growth equals real growth (6-n).
The only source of seigniorage revenues that is available to the
treasuries is due to real growth, so that if previously treasuries
relied on inflation taxes as well, taxes must be raised or the level of
exhaustive government spending must be cut.
3. European Monetary Union with an independent central bank
3.1 The model
The EMU consists of N countries. Since individual treasuries of the
EMU are, according to the proposals of the Delors Committee, no longer
allowed to prili:, money and they only get these seigniorage revenues
which accrue through real growth (si-nm), their intertemporal budget
constraints must when they are solvent be given by:
rdi t gP - TP f nm, i-1,...,N. (3. 1)
where we have assumed that seigniorage revenues collected by the ESCB
are equally distributed to the treasuries of the EMU.12 We abstract from
12 When the ESCB manages the value of the ECU in world markets, one should take
account of interest losses or gains on foreign reserves (e.g.,
dollar-dominated assets) in the budget constraint of the ESCB. However, if
foreign reserves earn a market rate of return, they can be netted out of the
ESCB's budget constraint (e.g., Buiter, 1990, Chapter 5).16
risk premia and assume that all bonds are perfect substitutes, which
means that European interest rates are tied to world interest rates.
The ESCB is independent and must pursue a stable price level, so that it
sets Europe's monetary growth rate equal to Europe's real growth rate
(9-n).
The quantity theory of money holds, so that m is constant. The
irrevocable fixity of exchange rates under the EMU implies, of course,
that all countries of the EMU experience a stable price level. The
consolidated budget constraint for the N treasuries and the ESCB is
given by
~ N




where d-(~ di) denotes the net consolidated government debt of the
i-1
EMU. The budget constraints of the private sectors of the EMU are given
by
bi - rbi t yi - ii - nm - ci, bi(0) - bio, i- 1,...,N, (3.3)
where bi, ci and yi denote the holdings of bonds by private agents, the
level of private consumption and the level of income of country i,
respectively. Full employment in country i implies that yi - 1. Net
N
holding of foreign assets by Europe are defined as f- E bi - d, so
i-1
that Europe's current account can be written as
~ N
f - rf t E (yi-ci-gi ) , f (0 ) - fo .
i-1
(3.4)
The sum on the right-hand side of (3.4) corresponds to Europe's balance
of trade with the rest of the world. We assume solvency of the N
private sectors, so that interest on assets plus the present value of17
the stream of future income minus direct taxes and growth taxes on
holdings of assets must be sufficient to finance the present value of
the stream of future consumption:
cP - rb, t yP - ip - nm, i-1,...,N. (3.3')
i i i i
Together with (3.1) this implies that Europe as a whole is solvent, so
that the present value of the stream of future balance-of-trade
surpluses must equal Europe's outstanding net foreign debt:
1 N ~ yP-cP-gP
r i-1
i i i
- -f . ( 3. 4' )
The EMU as a whole faces this intertemporal budget constraint, but
individual EMU-countries do not face such a constraint.
We assume that goods produced by the various European countries are
perfect substitutes and that the "law of one price" holds for Europe,
which is of course unreasonable. However, a strict interpretation of
the planned integration of goods markets throughout Europe ("1992" and
all that) may warrant such a heroic assumption as a short cut.
Purchasing power parity between Europe and the rest of the world is even
more unrealistic, hence we reject this and assume that goods from Europe
and from elsewhere are imperfect substitutes.i3 Equilibrium in the market
for European goods requires
13
In any case, there is a lot of empirical evidence which suggests that
volatility in real and in nominal exchange rates go together (Mussa, 1986).
More precisely, in moving to the EMS the volatility of intra-European nominal
exchange rates and of real exchange rates decreased substantially (Mussa,
1990). Hence, from an empirical point of view, it may not be that
unreasonable to assume that the "law of one price" holds roughly within the
EMU. Since the exchange rate of the ECU vis-à-vis the rest of the world is
supposed to float, it is not reasonable to assume the "law of one price"
between Europe and the rest of the world.18
N N N
m m
E yi - E(cifgi) } c,~ - E E ci ,
i-1 i-1 i-1
(3. S)
where c~ denotes exports of Europe to the rest of the world, ci denotes
imports by country i of the EMU from countries outside the EMU, and E
denotes the real exchange rate of Europe (the relative price of goods
from outside Europe in terms of European goods). We assume a
Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function in terms of goods from Europe and from
elsewhere, so that c~ -~~c,~E and ci- ~ci~E, i-1,...,N, where ~ (~~)
denotes the constant value-share of imported goods in total private
expenditure of Europe (the rest of the world) and c,~ denotes the
exogeneous level of total private expenditure of the rest of the world.
Upon substitution into (3.5), we obtain the real exchange rate
of Europe:
N ,~
E- E 1[li -(1-~)ci-gi]I(~ c,~). (3.6)
When producers' prices are a fixed mark-up (wl~l) on wages in Europe,
real incomes in Europe are given by
w- wo E-~ ~ wo(1-~E). wo -(w2~w1) ~ 0, (3.7)
where w2 denotes the level of the productivity of labour. Hence, an
increase in spending by any of the N treasuries leads ceteris paribus to
a one-for-one deficit in Europe's current account and an excess demand
for European goods. The latter is choked off by an appreciation of the
real exchange rate of Europe, which induces a fall in consumers' prices
and a boost in real income for Europe.
The rate of expected CPI-inflation in Europe, ~(EIE), is positive
(negative) when Europe's real exchange rate is expected to depreciate,
i.e., when Europe's real interest rate exceeds (is below) the real
interest rate of the rest of the world, but this can only, of course, be
a temporary event. We are concerned with what fiscal policies should be19
pursued by each of the treasuries of the EM[-1, We assume that each
treasury wishes to attain a desired level of exhaustive public spending
(gi), a desired level of private spending (ci), a desired tax rate
associated with no distortions (zero), and a desired level of the real
exchange rate of Europe and thus of real income (wi). Since we assume
that the internal market for Europe is completed, it seems reasonable to
suppose that each treasury also cares about an appropriate level of
public goods in other countries of the EMU and also attempts to maintain
a better tax climate than in other counties of the EMU. Furthermore,
each treasury minimises quadratic deviations from these desired levels
and trades off all these objectives by giving different weights to them.
Each treasury chooses a sequence of tax rates and levels of exhaustive
public and private spending to minimise its welfare-loss function,
W. - 1 f exp(-rt) 3' (g.-g. )2 f 2' (c.-c. )2 t 2' T2 t 2' (w.-w )2
i 2 0 1 i i 2 i i 3 i 4 i i
f 3'S j~i(gj-gj)2 f 2'6 j~i(Tj-ii-i) 2ldt, (3.8)
subject to the constraints (3.1), (3.3'), (3.6) and (3.7). Hence,
treasuries attempt to maintain an adequate level of public goods and of
real income, to have a tax advantage over their competitors, and at the
same time use the current account to smooth private consumption and use
government debt to smooth tax distortions. In Section 2, we abstracted
from pure fiscal externalities and effectively assumed that
~1-á2-~4-a~5-á6-0.
3.2 The non-cooperative outcome
This outcome corresponds to a Nash-Cournot outcome for a
differential game with pre-commitment. The Hamiltonian for treasury i
is defined as:20
N 2
Hi - 22'1(gi-gi)2 t 2~2(ci-ci)2 t 22'3Ti t 2~4 E Yj-(1-~)cj-gj t wi
j-1
2 2
1 t 2 E~5 gj-gj t~6 ij-ii-z f
j~i
- . ~
where ~4 -(wo~~c,~~ )~4' wi -(c~,~ ~woí~)(wi-wo)' ai denotes the
marginal welfare loss arising from an additional unit of treasury debt
for country i, and pi denotes the marginal welfare gain arising from an
additional unit of private assets for country i. When the mark-up
desired by workers in country i(wi) exceeds what is left of
productivity once firms have taken their cut (wo), country i attempts to
increase its real income beyond what it can afford by appreciating the
real value of the exchange rate of Europe (i~i~0). The first-order
conditions for treasury i are:
2'1(gi-gi) t ai - 2'4 E lyj-(1-~)cj-gjl t~i
j 1L J
~2(ci-ci) t F~i - 2'4(1-~) E Iyj-(1-~)cj-gjl f i~i (3.11)
~ ll J
ai(rdifgi-ii-nm) - ~i(rbityi-ci-ti-nm) (3.9)
(3. 10)
N





(3.1) and (3.3'). In deriving the first-order conditions treasury i
takes the policy actions of the other treasuries (cj,gj,j~i) as given,
hence the equilibrium concept assumes zero conjectural variations and
corresponds to a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot outcome with21
pre-commitment,
Combining the first-order conditions, we find that tp - ii' gi - ii
f nm - rdi and cP - rbi f yp - ii - nm so that we can solve for (gi. ci.
ti,i-1,...,N) from:
(1-~)2' g--g-(rd.tg.-i.-nm) - 2' (c.-c~.) } rb. t yP - z. -nm - c.
1 i i i i i 2 i i i i i i
N
~1 gi-g-(rditgi-ti-nm) t ó4 E yj-yp-(rdjfgj-zj-nm) t
j-1
(3. 14)
(1-~)(rbjfyP-ij-nm-cj)I f w. - i~P~ - 0 (3.15)
i i
- - - N
~1(gi-gi) -~2(ci-ci) t~3ii - 2'4 E Yj-(1-~)cj-gj t c~i
j-1
N
f 2'6 E(z~iiT) ~
j~i
( 3. 16 )
i-1,...,N. It seems sensible to focus separately on the three
externalities: (i) spending by individual treasuries is a public good to
Europe as a whole; (ii) international tax competition; and (iii) the
real exchange rate and current account of Europe are jointly determined.
3.2.1 Tax and consumption smoothing
Let us first discuss the case where treasuries are not concerned
with using the real exchange rate of Europe to boost the real income of
their citizens (~4-0) or with trying to achieve a better tax climate
than abroad (~6 -0). The advantage of this case is that treasuries make
up their mind about policy without taking into account the actions of
the other treasuries. The result is:
gN-gi - 2'2(rbifyP-c~.l) -(á2}á3)(rdi f g) t~3nm (3.17)
cN-ci - (2'lt2'3)(rbityP-cp) - ~1(rdifg ) - ~3nm (3.18)22
TN - ~1(rdifg ) t 2'2(rbiyP-ci) - (1-~~nm (3.19)
dN - gi - g, di(0) - di0
bN - (yi-yP) - ( ci-c~.l) . bi(0) - bi0
( 3. 20 )
(3. 21 )
~ N
fN- E (yi-yp)-(gi-g )-(ci-cP) . f(0) - fo (3.22)
i-1
where the normalisation
ál }~2 t~3 - 1 has been used. The most
striking result is that treasuries only borrow when they temporarily
desire to have a higher level of exhaustive public spending, i.e., when
they anticipate that their desired level of exhaustive spending falls in
the future. A good example is public investment in the environment or
education, because then public spending will temporarily be high in
order to finance the investment and in the future the treasury reaps the
benefits and thus public spending, net of returns on investment
projects, will be lower. If public investment projects enjoy a market
rate of return, the permanent level of public spending is unaffected and
treasuries should borrow for investment projects. It is a pity that the
Delors Committee did not even allow individual governments to borrow for
capital expenditures (as effectively is the case in the U.S. ). A more
traditional example is that treasuries should borrow in war time. Tax
rates are smoothed in the sense that they only respond to permanent
changes in the desired levels of exhaustive public and private spending
and in income. Similarly, private agents only save (borrow) when their
current income exceeds (falls short of) their permanent income and when
their desire for consumption is expected to increase (fall). The EMU as
a whole borrows, i.e., has a deficit on its current account, when the
public or the private sectors temporarily desire a higher level of
consumption and when income is temporarily below its permanent level.
These results on tax smoothing (e.g., Barro, 1979) and on consumption
smoothing (e.g., Sachs, 1981) are, of course, a direct consequence of
the life-cycle hypothesis.23
When the level of exhaustive public spending is exogeneous (~1 ~ 1,
gi - gi), tax rates are set to finance debt service plus the permanent
level of public spending (ii-rdi f gP - nm) and private consumption
equals its desired level minus the permanent level of the trade deficit
minus debt service of the treasury plus interest income derived from
bond holdings (ci - ci t r(bi-di) t yP - gP - cP). Ricardian debt
neutrality holds, so that treasury debt is not a part of private wealth
and interest received from the treasury is not part of private income.
With exogeneous levels of exhaustive public spending the problems of tax
and of consumption smoothing are decoupled (cf., Roubini, 1988).14 In
general, the exhaustive spending of treasuries is endogenous and
responds positively to permanent income and private assets and
negatively to outstanding treasury debt. When permanent income and
private asset holdings are higher, the treasuries can afford to have
more exhaustive public spending and higher tax rates. Similarly, when
debt service and the permanent level of desired public spending
increases, private consumption must be reduced. Seigniorage revenues
only accrue through real growth under an independent ESCB and are used
to cut taxes and raise the level of exhaustive public spending at the
expense of private consumption.
3.2.2. International tax competition
Now also allow for the effects of international tax competition
(~6~0). It can then be shown that (3.20)-(3.22) hold as before,
gN - gi - rN t nm -(rdi t gP), cN - ci -(rbityp-cP) - ii - nm, and
14 When the desired level of consumption is constant and one allows for
investment one has that Europe's current account must equal transitory income
minus the consolidated public sector budget deficit for Europe minus
investment. In other words, international capital mobility implies that
investment must be financed through capital inflows and be unrelated to
private saving. Taking account of the independent role of public budget





-~6(N-1)z t 2~1(rditgP) t á2(rbityP-cP)
E ~llydjtgPlf~2(rbjfy~-c~l -
j~i l 1 l J
(1-~3)nm (3.19)
International tax competition becomes more important once the
European markets for goods, services and factors of production have been
completed ("1992"). Individual treasuries will be increasingly
concerned with keeping their tax rates in line with those abroad,
because otherwise their workers will prefer to migrate to the rest of
the EMU and their consumers will prefer to buy their products from the
rest of the EMU. Treasuries do not want their tax rates to diverge too
much from their competitors, because otherwise they lose all their
revenues to their competitors.ls Indeed, one of the main concerns of
Dutch macroeconomic policy is to bring marginal income tax rates and VAT
rates down to the European average or, more specifically, to the German
levels. This is the reason why we choose to have ~6~0. Indeed
convergence is a major objective, but it is not clear what one should
converge to (the lowest, the highest or the average tax rate?) and
whether one converges to Pareto-efficient levels of tax rates or not.
In order to get a grip on this question, we assume that individual
treasuries attempt to have a better tax climate than in the rest of the
EMU in order to be a tax haven. This is why we choose i~0.
When all the countries of the EMU have identical levels of
permanent income, private and public debt, and desired private and
public consumption, tax rates will be downward biased to the extent of
~6(N-1)t. The bias increases as the number of inember countries of the
EMU increases and arises from futile, beggar-thy-neighbour attempts to
cut tax rates. In general, when an individual treasury is faced with
competitors in the EMU who have a much lower need for revenues, due to
15
In fact, this statement is only true when lower taxes are not capitalised.
If one country has lower taxes, then house prices may go up by exactly the
same amount as the annuity value of the tax advantage.25
lower levels of debt and permanent levels of public spending, it will be
forced to cut tax rates, cut public consumption, and allow private
consumption to flourish, even though it is faced with a large need for
government revenues. Tax smoothing does not only occur over time, but
also across different countries.
3.2.3 Real i ncome and Europe's real exchange rate
Finally, also allow individual treasuries to manipulate the real
value of the ECU in order to boost the income of their citizens ( ~4~0).
Budgetary policies of the various treasuries now jointly determine
Europe's real exchange rate and current account. In order to focus on
the nature of this externality alone, we assume that all exogeneous
variables are the same for all countries of the EMU and that there are
no transitory shocks (yi-yP-y, ci-cP-c, gi-gp-g, i~i-wP-w). It then
follows that g.-i.fnm-rd., c.-rb.fy-i.-nm, and





( 3. 19" )
where ~-[1-~3f~4 ~2N]N. The effect of treasuries being concerned with
the real income of their citizens is to attenuate the positive effect of
desired exhaustive public spending and the negative effect of private
spending on the tax rate and to reduce the downward bias in tax rates
arising from international tax competition. The cut in tax rates
arising from seigniorage revenues is larger when countries care about
real income. An increase in the desired level of real income leads to
an increase in the tax rate and public consumption and to a fall in
private consumption, because this induces an appreciation of the real
value of the ECU versus currencies of the rest of the world, reduces the
costs of goods imported from the rest of the world, and thus boosts the
real income of the citizens of the EMU.
3.3 The cooperative outcome
The previous section characterised the non-cooperative fiscal
policy responses under the EMU. Here we compare them with the26
cooperative outcome. In order not to gst side-tracked by what the
appropriate outcome of the bargaining process between the N countries
should be, we focus on a symmetric version of the problem. Hence, we
assume that
dio - do' bio - bo' gi - g' ci - c' yi - y and wi - c~,
i-1,...,N. This means that, under European coordination of fiscal
policies, (gi, ci Ti, i-1,...,N) are jointly chosen to minimise the sum
N
of the welfare-loss functions of the countries of the EMU ( E Wi)
i-1
subject to the constraints (3.2), (3.4' ), (3.6), 3.7) and (3.8). The
details of solving this problem for the European Council of Ministers of
Finance are more straightforward than those of Section 3 and are thus
omitted.
3.3.1 Inadequate provision of public goods
We first consider the case where treasuries do not attempt to
appreciate the real exchange rate of Europe in order to boost the real
income of their citizens (~4-0). In view of the planned completion of
the internal market for Europe, it seems reasonable to assume that
countries care more and more about each others' levels of public
spending on the environment, training of low-skilled workers, research
and development, foreign aid (e.g., to Eastern Europe), infrastructure,
museums, etcetera (~5~0). Although each co~~Ztry of the EMU benefits from
a higher level of public goods provided by other countries of the EMU,
they do not have to pay the price in the form of higher taxes for it.
Absence of coordination of budgetary policies means that exhaustive
public spending is not recognised as a public good for Europe as a whole
and consequently its supply will be inadequate. In order to see this,
consider the results for the cooperative outcome (3.20)-(3.22),
C - ó2[rffN(yp-cp-gp)) - ~3[rdtN(gp-nm)l
gi-g -
[lt~s(N-1)]N
( 3. 23 )
C - [2'lt2'3t2'S(N-1 ) ) [rftN(yp-cp-gp) ] t ~3[rdtN(gp-nm) ]
ci-c - (3.24)
[1f~5(N-1)lN27
C [~1}~2}~S(N-1)l[rdtN(gp-nm)] f 2'2[rftN(yp-cp-gp)]
Ti - [1f~5(N-1)]N
( 3. 25)
i-1,...,N. When we set ~5-0, there are no externalities and the
cooperative outcome (3.23)-(3.25) reduces to the non-cooperative outcome
(3.17)-(3.19). It is clear that, in general, gN~ gC t g. Hence, absence
of coordination under the EMU leads to an under-provision of public
goods. Cooperation means that treasuries spend more, so that less is
available for private consumption (cC~cN~c) and direct taxes must be
raised
(zC~~N~O) 16
A special case needs to be made for public investment. In view of
the developments in Eastern Europe, the bad state of the environment and
the demand for infrastructure, this is badly needed in Europe. There
are two aspects of this type of public investment that should be
stressed: its international and its intertemporal nature. Since public
investment is a public good for Europe as a whole, its supply will be
deficient in the absence of budgetary policy coordination. Just as
important, however, is the fact that public investment with a market
rate of return leaves the permanent level of exhaustive public spending
uneffected, but increases the current level. The optimal response from
the point of view of public finance is to borrow and leave tax rates
unaffected. Unfortunately, the Delors Report recommends guidelines on
public sector deficits without making a reference to public investment
or to permanent levels of public spending. Such a myopic view on public
finance is bad economics and bound to harm public investment in Europe.
Much better is to advocate the "golden rule" of public finance: tax for
permanent increases in exhaustive public spending, but borrow for
temporary increases in exhaustive public spending associated with, for
example, public investment.
16
We have assumed that rd t N(gp-nm) is positive and rf t N(yp-cp-gp) is
negative.28
3.3.Z Competiiion pushes tax rates down
Now consider the situation where individual treasuries also try to
keep their tax rates a bit below the rest of the EMU (~6~0. T~0). In
fact, the cooperative outcome then corresponds exactly to (3.23)-(3.25).
The reason is that when the treasuries coordinate their fiscal policies,
they realise that in equilibrium it is futile to attempt to get a better
tax climate than its EMU-competitors and thus beggar-thy-neighbour tax
cuts are avoided. Absence of coordination leads to an additional
downward bias in tax rates, -~6(N-1)-c, which means that the public
sector will have to dwindle and the private flourishes even more. The
outcome under tax competition is inefficient, since all members of the
EMU would be better off if tax rates and thus the size of the public
sector are increased. The inefficiency would be somewhat less if we
allowed countries to compete in the provision of public goods (e.g., an
efficient legal system) as well. The theory of clubs may then serve as
a useful guide to decide whether a sub-group of countries wishes to
specialise in the production of certain public goods or specialise in
tax havens for some taxes or not.
More static, micro-based stories of tax competition and tax
harmonisation argue that the completion of the internal market increases
the possibility of tax avoidance and makes a number of economic
activities more elastic so that, in order to avoid a large excess burden
relative to the revenues collected, they should not be taxed very much
(Sinn, 1989; also Keen, 1989; Frenkel and Razin, 1989). The winner of
this uncoordinated process of tax harmonisation will thus be the more
mobile workers, who are better able to make use of tax havens, the
owners of capitals, and to a certain extent consumers (as competition
forces down VAT rates ), whereas the poor and less mobi le workers wi 11
lose out (Sinn, 1989). Countries with high benefits will have to reduce
them, for otherwise they will attract the poor from everywhere and their
welfare-state system will collapse. Although some of these tax
distortions associated with tax evasion can be avoided through, say,
basing income taxes on nationality rather than on residence17, by far the
17
Another set of results is that the residence principle leads to an
inefficient world allocation of saving, that the source principle leads to an29
best way seems to go for a coordinated approach to tax harmonisation.18
3.3.3 Cooperation avoids an under-valued ECU
Finally, consider the case where the treasuries cooperatively try
to determine the value of the ECU in order to boost the real income of
all citizens of the EMU (~4~0). As in Section 3.2.3, we assume that





The positive effect of desired exhaustive public spending and the
negative effect of desired private spending on the tax rate are less
than in the absence of cooperation, both of which tend to reduce taxes
and exhaustive public spending. As far as the current-account
externality is concerned, exhaustive public spending is a public good
for it appreciates the real value of the ECU, reduces the cost of
imported goods for all EMU-citizens, and thus boosts the real income of
all EMU-citizens. This is another reason that, in the absence of
cooperation, the level of exhaustive public spending and tax rates
throughout the EMU are too low. The special case á1-~2-~5-0
illustrates
the basis point perhaps better:
~ ~(N-1)
T~ - iN - f~(Nyfrd-Nm)-(1-~)rff~~ 4 ~ 0. (3.26)
i i L (1f~4~2N)(1f~4~2N2)
Absence of cooperation means that the treasuries are much less bothered
inefficient world allocation of investment, and that in a market-clearing
world with perfect capital mobility (and the interest rate determined on the
world market) the residence principle is optimal and there are no gains from
tax coordination (Razin and Sadka, 1989)
18
Given the liberalisation and integration of markets for capital, goods and
services, there is much scope for individual European countries to impose
adverse externalities on others and thus there is a need for coordination of
capital income taxation within Europe, starting with agreeing on a tax base
and followed by setting minimum statutory rates (Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990).30
with attempting to appreciate the real value of the ECU and boosting
real income, so that the level of exhaustive public spending will be too
low. Effectively, each EMU-country attempts to pass the burden of
appreciating the real value of Europe's currency on to its
EMU-competitors.
It is possible to think of other inefficiencies associated with the
common determination of Europe's current account and real exchange rate.
The EMU as a whole might have an explicit target value for its current
account, perhaps, a deficit because Europe wants capital from outside to
pour into Europe in order to rebuild Eastern-Europe. Since none of the
EMU-countries sees Europe's current account as its prime responsibility,
each one of them will try to shift the burden of loosening the fiscal
stance to its EMU-competitors. The result is that public spending as a
whole will be too low throughout the EMU, and capital inflows into
Europe will not be high enough, relative to the outcome where all
EMU-countries coordinate their budgetary policies.
So far, we assumed, in contrast to the recommendations of the
Delors Report, that guidelines for public sector deficits are
unnecessary and, perhaps, even undesirable. However, the externalities
associated with the joint determination of Europe's current account
suggest that it may be advisable to impose a requirement on the overall
public borrowing requirement for Europe. The point is that, if
EMU-countries only consider their own current account and not the
current account of Europe, then such limits on borrowing from outside
the European Community may act as a substitute for European coordination
of budgetary policies.
4. Conclusions
A monetary union without an independent central bank leads, without
coordination of the policies of the various fiscal and monetary
authorities, to excessive inflation and to too low tax rates throughout
the region. The reason is that each treasury fails to internalise the
adverse effects of grabbing more seigniorage on the common inflation
rate. An independent central bank for the region is inefficient from a31
public-finance point of view, since it gives rise to too high tax rates
and to too low inflation rates. Nevertheless, an independent central
bank is often desirable because it is more likely to have a strong
monetary discipline and thus individual treasuries no longer have a
temptation to levy a surprise inflation tax. To assess the case for an
independent ESCB, one should trade off the advantages associated with
better monetary discipline and lower inflation against the disadvantages
associated with a sub-optimal public revenue mix. When the level of
nominal public debt is high and when the priority one attaches to price
stability is much more important than the priority one attaches to
cutting tax distortions, one comes out in favour of an independent ESCB.
Indeed, an independent ESCB is what the Delors Committee seems to
advocate for the EMU. In addition, it is recommended that under the EMU
national treasuries can no longer finance their deficits by inflation
taxes. There does not seem much merit in the proposals of the Delors
Committee for upper limits on government borrowing. However, it may be
desirable, from the point of view of the value of the ECU in world
markets and Europe's current account, to allow individual governments to
borrow what they want from European households and institutions, but to
constrain them in their borrowing from outside the European Community.
There are good reasons to believe that the size of the public
sector will be too small under the EMU, unless the treasuries of Europe
coordinate their budgetary policies. The first is that with an
independent ESCB seigniorage revenues only accrue through real growth,
so that taxes must be raised and spending on public goods must be cut.
A related problem is that, even though the inflation tax must disappear,
real growth leads to seigniorage revenues and it will be a major
political issue to decide how these revenues will be distributed to the
members of the EMU. The second is that public spending on items as the
environment, foreign aid, research and development, and infrastructure
is with the completion of the internal market more like a public good as
far as the rest of the EMU is concerned, whose supply will be inadequate
unless treasuries cooperate. The third is that international
competition between treasuries forces tax rates down and leaves less
funds for spending on public goods. The fourth is that treasuries may
wish to increase spending in order to appreciate the real exchange rate0
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of Europe and boost the real income of their citizens. Since this
policy also has beneficial effects on the rest of the EMU, exhaustive
public spending will be too low unless cooperation takes place. These
reasons are derived from considerations of public finance and of
efficiency in allocation. When one considers the stabilisation role of
fiscal policies within the context of a Mundell-Fleming model of the
EMU, one can show that completion of the internal market and absence of
coordination leads to too tight fiscal stances when Europe is confronted
with an adverse supply shock (van der Ploeg, 1989b). All these reasons
should give clear signals that the EMU may spell dangers for the degree
to which governments are prepared to tackle the problem of stagflation
and wide-spread unemployment and for the size of the public sector in
Europe.
There is thus a danger that the size of the public sector under the
EMU will be too small relative to the first-best outcome, but it is a
legitimate question to ask whether the current size of the public sector
is too large relative to the first-best outcome. Many people believe
that the size of the public sector is currently too large relative to
the first-best outcome,l9 so that we are now in a second-best world.
Introducing distortions in a second-best world may be desirable when
this cancels the effect of other distortions. However, the experience
of the U. S. suggests that the EMU indeed poses a threat to the size of
the public sector. In the long run, when the EMU is firmly established,
Europe may have to get used to the problem of coping with a too small
size of the public sector. In the medium run, the absence of
coordination of budgetary policies may more quickly cut the size of the
public sector and bring Europe more quickly in the direction of the
first-best optimum. People who believe that the current size of the
public sector in Europe is too large should like this.
19 To be fair, it is usually argued that this is due to too high levels of
transfer payments rather than to too much provision of public goods.33
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